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Abstract
Indirect network effects exist when the utility of consumers is increasing in the variety of
complementary products available for use with an electronic hardware device. In this note,
we examine how indirect network effects work as a determinant of trade patterns. For these
purposes we construct a simple two-country model of trade with incompatible
country-specific hardware technologies. We show that trade patterns are determined by the
interaction between hardware differentiation and indirect network effects due to software
availability.
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Indirect network eﬀects exist when the utility of consumers is increasing
in the variety of complementary software products available for an electronic
hardware device. Examples of such devices include personal computers, video
casette recorders, and consumer electronics products. Despite the fact that
many industries characterized by indirect network eﬀects are crucially related
to growing world trade, the literature on indirect network eﬀects is almost
exclusively focused on closed economies.1 Since the role of indirect network
eﬀects is ampliﬁed in the globalized world,2 it seems important to explore
the role of indirect network eﬀects as a determinant of trade patterns.
As our primary contribution, we examine how trade patterns are deter-
mined in the presence of indirect network eﬀects. For these purposes we
construct a simple two-country model of trade with incompatible country-
speciﬁc hardware technologies which is an extension of Church and Gandal’s
(1992) closed-economy model. Assuming that the distribution of the tastes
of consumers are mirror images of each country’s distribution, we show that
trade patterns are determined by the interaction between hardware diﬀeren-
tiation and indirect network eﬀects due to software availability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
basic model. Section 3 describes the trading equilibrium. Section 4 contains
concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Suppose that there are two countries in the world, Home and Foreign. In each
country there are three types of goods: hardware, a large variety of software
products, and the outside good. We assume that there are country-speciﬁc
hardware technologies: Home hardware and Foreign hardware. We also as-
sume that the hardware technologies are incompatible: software written for
one country’s hardware will not work with the other country’s. The char-
1 The seminal contributions on the role of a “hardware/software” system are Chou and
Shy (1990) and Church and Gandal (1992). See Gandal (2002) for surveys.
2 Gandal and Shy (2001, p. 364) notes that, in 1992, it was estimated that seventy-two
percent of all personal computers throughout the world were IBM-compatibles. That is,
they ran the MS-DOS operating system and were compatible with applications software
written for the MS-DOS operating system. Accordingly, Gandal (2001) argues that it
would be interesting to quantify trade ﬂows in this industry over time.
1acterization (i.e., location) of the two country-speciﬁc hardware technologies
is exogenous: each is located at the end point of the unit line: let Home
technology be at the left end point and Foreign technology at the right end
point. We denote the marginal cost of hardware production in each coun-
try by c, which implies there are no sources for comparative advantage. We
further assume that the hardware technologies are non-proprietary and that
they will be oﬀered at marginal cost. In this section, we consider the Home
autarky situation where only Home hardware is available.
Consumer preferences over the combination of hardware and software are
modelled as a CES utility function.3 We assume that the distribution of the
tastes of Home consumers is decreasing along a line of unit length t 2 [0;1].
We also assume that the density of type t consumers in Home is 1¡t: the total
number of Home consumers is 1=2. Consumer densities are mirror images of
each other: in Foreign, the density of type t consumers is t.







+ Á ¡ kt; 1=2 < µ < 1; (1)
where n is the number of software products written for the Home hardware,
xi is the level of consumption of software product i, ¾ ´ 1=(1 ¡ µ) > 2 is
the elasticity of substitution between every pair of software products, Á is
the standalone beneﬁt of the hardware, and we assume that Á > k. k is the
parameter which measures the degree of diﬀerentiation of two hardwares.
The representative consumer who purchases the hardware will maximize
(1) subject to the following budget constraint:
Pn
i pixi = e ¡ c; where pi
is the price of Home software variety i, e is the total expenditure allocated
to hardware and software, and c is the price (i.e., cost) of a unit of Home
hardware. The solution to this problem consists of the following demand
functions:












The indirect utility of a type-t consumer who purchases a Home system is
V (t) = n
1=(¾¡1)(e ¡ c)=p + Á ¡ kt: (4)
3 See, Chou and Shy (1990) and Church and Gandal (1992).
2The technology for the production of software is characterized by in-
creasing returns to scale. We denote the constant marginal cost of software
production for every product by b, and the software development cost by
f. It is assumed that, if Home ﬁrms develop software products for Foreign
hardware, there is an additional ﬁxed cost g: it can be interpreted as a cost
for collecting information about Foreign technology.4 We also assume that
software ﬁrms are monopolistic competitors, and thus, each product is priced
at a markup over marginal cost b: p = b¾=(¾¡1): Then the proﬁt of a Home
software ﬁrm is5
¼ = (p ¡ b)(x=2) ¡ f; (5)
where x = (e¡c)=np. In the autarky situation in which only Home hardware
exists, all Home software ﬁrms choose to provide software that is compatible
with Home hardware. The number of Home software ﬁrms is determined via
free entry as follows: nA = (e¡c)=2f¾; where A refers to the autarky value.
3 Trading Equilibrium
The commencement of trade implies two basic changes in the market: (a)
both Home and Foreign hardware devices are available to all consumers, and
(b) the distribution of consumers’ tastes is uniform along the line and the
total number of consumers becomes 1.
The timing of the game is as follows:6 In the ﬁrst stage software ﬁrms
enter the industry. There is free entry into the software industry and software
ﬁrms have rational expectations. Although there may be more than one
equilibrium software conﬁguration, we show that the free-entry number of
software ﬁrms, N = n + n¤, is unique, where n and n¤ are the number of
ﬁrms providing software for Home and Foreign hardware, respectively. In the
second stage, software ﬁrms simultaneously choose which platform to provide
software for. In the ﬁnal stage, each consumer purchases either a Home or
a Foreign hardware system and some of the compatible software. We solve
this problem backward.
4 This assumption implies that software products for one country’s hardware are pro-
duced by ﬁrms located in that country.
5 Note that the total size of the Home consumer is 1=2.
6 This is taken from Church and Gandal’s (1992) closed-economy model.
33.1 Final Stage
Since we assume the marginal costs (prices) of hardware and software are
equal for both systems, consumers determine which hardware to purchase
considering only their tastes and the amount of software available for each
system. From (4), a consumer located at t purchases Home hardware if the
following inequality holds:
n
1=(¾¡1)(e ¡ c)=p + Á ¡ kt > (N ¡ n)
1=(¾¡1)(e ¡ c)=p + Á ¡ k(1 ¡ t); (6)
where use has been made of the equation n+n¤ = N. Therefore, the location
of the marginal consumer who purchase Home hardware is given by a function
of n, that is,
t(n) = [n
1=(¾¡1) ¡ (N ¡ n)
1=(¾¡1)](e ¡ c)(¾ ¡ 1)=2kb¾ + 1=2: (7)










This means that the share of Home hardware is increasing in the amount of
software for it. It can also be shown that
t(0) ¸ 0 and t(N) · 1 () N
1=(¾¡1) · kb¾=[(e ¡ c)(¾ ¡ 1)] (9)
and
t
0(N=2) ¸ 1=N () N
1=(¾¡1) ¸ 2
1=(¾¡1)kb¾=2(e ¡ c): (10)
Based on the above, we can draw the function t(n) as shown in Figure 1,7
where curves A, B, and C correspond to the graph of t(n) under each of
the following three cases: in case A, N1=(¾¡1) · kb¾=[(e ¡ c)(¾ ¡ 1)]; in case
B, kb¾=[(e ¡ c)(¾ ¡ 1)] < N1=(¾¡1) < 21=(¾¡1)kb¾=2(e ¡ c); and in case C,
N1=(¾¡1) ¸ 21=(¾¡1)kb¾=2(e ¡ c).8




[n(3¡2¾)=(¾¡1) ¡ (N ¡ n)
(3¡2¾)=(¾¡1)](¾ ¡ 2)(e ¡ c)
2kb¾(¾ ¡ 1)
;
where ¾ > 2 from the assumption µ > 1=2.
8 The importance of discrimination between case B and C will appear in the following.
4Note that in cases B and C, t(n) can reach 0 or 1, even if there are still
two types of software. Since the market is of unit length, that is, 0 · t · 1,
there exists a critical number of software ﬁrms for each type of hardware such
that if the number of software ﬁrms for one technology exceeds the critical
number, then all consumers purchase the dominant hardware. On the other
hand, in case A, there are two types of consumers unless one hardware is
standardized; no software for the other hardware exists.9
3.2 Second Stage
In the second stage, software ﬁrms simultaneously select the network for
which to supply software are. Given the marginal consumer, t, and the
number of competing software ﬁrms (n or n¤), the proﬁt of a software ﬁrm
writing software for Home hardware is10
¼(t; n) = t(p ¡ b)x ¡ f = t(e ¡ c)=n¾ ¡ f; (11)
and that for Foreign hardware is
¼
¤(t; n
¤) = (1 ¡ t)(p ¡ b)x
¤ ¡ f = (1 ¡ t)(e ¡ c)=n
¤¾ ¡ f; (12)












Based on the latter inequality, each ﬁrm considers whether t(n) is greater
than n=N or not, and then chooses the network to supply.
3.3 First Stage
At any equilibrium where two networks coexist, ¼(t; n) = ¼¤(t; n¤) must be
satisﬁed. Therefore, t = n=N holds at the equilibrium and
¼ = ¼
¤ = (e ¡ c)=N¾ ¡ f: (14)
9 Since we assume that hardware only facilitates the consumption of software and pro-
vides no stand-alone beneﬁts, in case A, the marginal consumer, t, changes discontinuously
to 0 or 1 when n is equal to 0 or N.
10 Note that softwares for one country’s hardware are produced by ﬁrms located in that
country. See Footnote 4.
5On the other hand, if all software ﬁrms provide software for one network at
equilibrium, then (t;n) = (1;N) or (t;n¤) = (0;N) hold and
¼ = (e ¡ c)=N¾ ¡ f or ¼
¤ = (e ¡ c)=N¾ ¡ f: (15)
Thus, the proﬁt of each ﬁrm is independent of equilibrium software con-
ﬁgurations, and the free-entry number of ﬁrms, N, is uniquely given by
N = (e ¡ c)=f¾ from the zero-proﬁt condition.
Based on the foregoing argument, we can conclude that ¼ = ¼¤ = 0 holds
for any pair (t;n) on the dotted line in Figure 1, ¼ = 0 at (1;N), and ¼¤ = 0
at (0;0), while ¼ (¼¤) is positive (negative) at any pair above the line and
vice versa.
3.4 Nash Equilibrium Conﬁgurations
Based on the foregoing argument, we obtain the Nash equilibrium conﬁgu-
rations as follows: In order for a conﬁguration to be a Nash equilibrium, it
must be impossible for a software ﬁrm to switch networks and increase its
proﬁt.
In case A, the graph of t(n) is drawn as curve A in Figure 1. So, there
are three equilibrium candidates; (n = n¤ = N=2), (n = N;n¤ = 0), and
(n = 0;n¤ = N). Since
t(n)
(
> n=N if n < N=2;
< n=N if n > N=2; (16)
we can conclude that only symmetric equilibrium (n = n¤ = N=2) is stable
in the sense of a Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, in case C, the graph is drawn as curve C and
t(n)
(
< n=N if n < N=2;
> n=N if n > N=2: (17)
Therefore, only two equilibria, (n = N;n¤ = 0) and (n = 0;n¤ = N), are
stable.11
Finally, in case B, the graph of t(n) is drawn as curve B and it is apparent
from the discussion above that all three of the equilibria, (n = n¤ = N=2),
11 In the interval of n where t(n) is greater than 1 (smaller than 0), the actual marginal
consumer, t, is equal to 1 (0) and is still above (below) the line t = n=N.
6(n = N;n¤ = 0), and (n = 0;n¤ = N), are stable. So, we have the following
proposition:
Proposition: Depending on the parameter values, the following three cases
emerge:
Case A: If N1=(¾¡1) · kb¾=[(e ¡ c)(¾ ¡ 1)], a unique symmetric equilibrium
exists, (n = n¤ = N=2). In this case, intra-industry trade in both hardware
and software products occurs between countries.
Case B: If kb¾=[(e ¡ c)(¾ ¡ 1)] < N1=(¾¡1) < 21=(¾¡1)kb¾=2(e ¡ c), three
equilibria, (n = n¤ = N=2), (n = N;n¤ = 0), and (n = 0;n¤ = N), exist.
Case C: If N1=(¾¡1) ¸ 21=(¾¡1)kb¾=2(e¡c), only two equilibria, (n = N;n¤ =
0) and (n = 0;n¤ = N), exist. In this case, no intra-industry trade occurs:
one country only imports other country’s hardware/software system.
These cases are summarized in Figure 2. In case A, the degree of hardware
diﬀerentiation (k) is relatively large and the equilibrium conﬁguration will
involve multiple networks. Home consumers located at 1=2 · t · 1 switch
to buy Foreign hardware and Foreign softwares, while Foreign consumers
located at 0 · t · 1=2 switch to buy Home hardware and Home softwares.
Thus, intra-industry trade in both hardware and software products occurs
between countries. In short, this case emphasizes the fact that, given that
the indirect network eﬀects are relatively small, trade is driven by product
diﬀerentiation of (country-speciﬁc) hardwares.
Contrast to this, in cases B and C, the equilibrium conﬁguration will most
likely be a single hardware/software system. In this case, no intra-industry
trade occurs: one country only imports other country’s hardware/software
system. Given that the indirect network eﬀects are relatively large, trade is
driven by demand-side scale economies: one country’s hardware (and hence
softwares written for that hardware) dominates the international market.
4 Conclusions
In this note, we examine how trade liberalization aﬀects production structure
in the presence of indirect network eﬀects. For these purposes we construct a
simple two-country model of trade with incompatible country-speciﬁc hard-
ware technologies. We show that trade patterns are determined by the in-
teraction between hardware diﬀerentiation and indirect network eﬀects due
7to software availability.
We believe that one beneﬁt of our model is its simplicity: the introduction
of indirect network eﬀects in the trade model does not make the exercise
intractable. This suggests that we can use this model, and make it more
complicated, to answer a certain number of questions. For example, we
could analyze the gains/losses from trade liberalization in the presence of
indirect network eﬀects.
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